People v. Berve by Carter, Jesse W.
Golden Gate University School of Law
GGU Law Digital Commons
Jesse Carter Opinions The Jesse Carter Collection
12-5-1958
People v. Berve
Jesse W. Carter
Supreme Court of California
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions
Part of the Evidence Commons
This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Jesse Carter Collection at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Jesse Carter Opinions by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Carter, Jesse W., "People v. Berve" (1958). Jesse Carter Opinions. Paper 6.
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions/6
286 
County 
A.LR 
The 
Carter, 
[51 C.2d 
CaL2d 624, 627-628 [145 P.2d 570, 153 
is reversed. 
Slwnk, .J., Sdwuer, .J., Spence, J., and 
did not herein. 
for a rehearing was denied December 
J., and Schauer, ,J., were of the opinion 
that the petition should be granted. 
N" o. G27 4. In Bnnk. Dec. 5, 1958.] 
THE PEOPI.~E, Hcspondent, v. NEJ_~LAHD ROBERT 
BERVE, Appellant. 
[1] Criminal Law- Evidence-Confessions-Voluntariness.-The 
u~e of confessions in a criminal prosecution obtained by force, 
fenr, of immunity or reward constitutes a denial of 
due process of ]a w both under the federal and state Consti-
tutions requiring a reversal of the conviction although other 
evidence may be consistent "·ith guilt. 
[2] Id.- Evidence- Confessions- Review.- It is a reviewing 
court's duty to examine uncontradicted facts to determine inde-
whether the trial court's conclusion of voluntariness 
of a confession was properly found. 
[3] !d.-Evidence-Confessions-Proof of Voluntary Character.-
The burden is on the prosecution to show that a confession was 
voluntarily giYen without previous inducement, intimidation 
or threat. 
[ 4] !d.-Evidence-Confessions-Voluntariness.-The test for vol-
untariness of a confession is whether or not the accused exer-
cised "mental freedom" in confessing or whether the confession 
was the of free choice; the slightest pressure, 
whether by way of inducement to confess, or threat if con-
fpssion is withheld, is sufficient to require exclusion of the 
confession. 
[1] :See Cal.Ju:r.2d, gvidence, § 422 et seq.; Am.Jur., Evidence, 
§ '18:2 d seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 4, 7, 11] Criminal Law, § 467; [2] 
Criminal Law,§ 480; [3] Criminal Law,~ 469(1); [5, 6, 8, 9] Crim-
inal Law,§ 4G7(11); [10] Criminal Law,§ 467(10). 
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[5] !d.-Evidence-Confessions--Effect of Prior Inducements,-
I3efore a confession may he admitted in the prosecu-
tion must show that such corrcive conditions ns once existed 
JJO longer prevailed at the time the coufoRsion was uttered. 
[6] !d.-Evidence-Confessions-Effect of Prior Inducements.-
The prosecution failed to show that coercive conditions result-
ing from beatings and threats administered hy the victim's 
husband and others in an attempt to force defendant to confess 
to murder by abortion ceased to e:xi~t in defendant's mind at 
the time he uttered his eonfession to pol ice officers, where 
there was no showing that threats of his torturers that he 
would be killed if he did not confess and that his pnrcnts would 
be harmed if they aided him were obliterated before his con-
fession, and where fear of his own life and those of his 
parents, compounded by the effects of his exhausting torture 
and his confused mental state, hovered over the accused during 
this confession. 
[7] Id.-Evidence-Confessions-Voluntariness.-'Where there are 
threats of mob violence against an a confession is 
deemed coereed and invalid on due process grounds. 
[8] !d.-Evidence-Confessions-Effect of Prior Inducements.-
Defendant's confession to murder by abortion was not freely 
and voluntarily given where the actual physical and psychologi-
cal effects of a beating he a bsorbetl at the hands of the victim's 
husband and others who kidnaped and tortured him were pain-
fully fresh when he eonfessed to police offlcers, and where, 
though there was no th)'eat of further violence by the police, 
th('Y made llO effort to assuage his physical suffering by giving 
him medical attention, opportunity to rest, or even sufficient 
\Yater to drink or wash himself, sinee elements of despair, 
fatigue, eraving for comprmionship, identifying one's inter-
rogator as a friend and source of aid, and of guilt 
werP pn's<'nL in :1 erudP, nl 
faetors in invalidating his ronfession. 
[9] !d.-Evidence-Confessions-Effect of Prior Inducements.--
Testimony of defendant nt the trial in 'Whirh he asserted his 
relief at being reseued hy police officers from the victim's 
vengeful relatives who were beating and threat<"ning him in 
an attempt to fon·e him to c-onfess to nmrdPr by abortion was 
not susceptible to the inferenee that the subse.quent confession 
was voluntary, where the purpo,;e of the two-hour inquisition 
was to instill iu defendant such fear for his own safety and 
that of his parents that he would confess to proper authoritie.,; 
although removed from immediate danger; momentary police 
sanetuary eould not still deJ\•ndant's terror unless accompa-
nied by promises o£ C'itective police protection. 
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[10] !d.-Evidence-Confessions-Person to Whom Made as Af-
fecting Voluntariness.~~-The mere f:wt that coercion 
defendant to eonfess civilians, not by the police to 
whom the confession was made, does not render the confession 
admissible; the prohibition the use o [ involuntary 
confessions is designed not as a regulation of the conduct 
of police officers, but also to insure that an accused's 
to a fair trial is protected. 
[11] Id.-Evidence-Confessions-Voluntariness.-The absence of 
volition condemns an enforced confession; due process requires 
that it be given voluntarily and without promise of immunity 
or reward. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Joseph M. Maltby, Judge. Reversed. 
Prosecution for murder. Judgment of conviction of second 
degree murder, reversed. 
Robert H. Aarons for Appellant. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Elizabeth Miller and 
Albert Bianchi, Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondent. 
CARTER, J.-Defendant, Nellard Berve, appeals from a 
judgment of conviction of murder in the second degree after 
a trial without a jury. His claim is that the coercive circum-
stances attending his confession rendered its use at the trial 
violative of the principles of due process of law, and accord-
ingly his conviction must fall. For the reasons stated below 
we find this contention meritorious. 
Defendant was alleged to have performed an abortion on 
one Mary M. Pettit. As a result of using unsterilized instru-
ments an infection developed in Mrs. Pettit that could not be 
cured and subsequently caused her death. The evidence, 
excluding defendant's confession, tended to show that defend-
ant performed the abortion. If believed, it would be sufficient 
to support a finding of guilt. 
At the trial a confession made by the defendant was intro-
duced into evidence over his objection that the confession was 
not voluntary. The objection was overruled and the confes-
sion was admitted. 
The following uncontroverted circumstances surround the 
making of the confession. 
Defendant was kidnaped at rifle point by Harry Pettit, the 
Dec.1958] PEOPLE v. BERVE 
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victim's husband. He was threatened with imminent death by 
a vengeful man who believed defendant had aborted his wife 
and caused her death. Holding a rifle to defendant's head, 
Pettit forced the defendant to drive to a strange house. Other 
relatives of Mrs. Pettit bent on revenge were there. Pettit 
showed the defendant a bullet from the rifle and told him that 
it was "his" bullet if he did not confess to killing Mrs. Pettit. 
He commanded the defendant to stare at the bullet for long 
periods while Pettit threatened his life. Pettit drummed it 
into the defendant's mind that he must confess or die. Pettit 
also threatened defendant's parents with dire consequences 
if they did anything in his defense. Then while Pettit pointed 
his rifle at the defendant, another man beat him with his fists. 
For almost two hours defendant was kicked and slugged with 
shoes, fists and furniture. A glass object was hurled at him. 
The kidnapers pushed his head through a window, cutting him. 
Pettit struck him in the groin with his rifle butt and hit him 
other places with it. Defendant received many blows on the 
head. This treatment terrorized, numbed, nauseated and 
caused defendant great pain. During this period the defend-
ant was constantly reminded that unless he confessed he would 
be murdered. 
In corroboration of this testimony, Officer Peterson, the 
arresting officer, testified that when he arrived on the scene 
he observed defendant's condition and that he was bleeding, 
bruised, perspiring and in a disheveled state. He saw Harry 
Pettit seated on a chair in front of defendant with a gun 
in his hands. He knew that defendant had been brought to 
the house at the point of a gun. He had seen defendant about 
two hours earlier and knew that his injuries had been inflicted 
in the meantime. 
Defendant's reaction to being rescued from his tormentors 
by the police was one of relief. 
The police arrested the defendant, handcuffed him and re-
moved him to the police station. He arrived at the station 
between 7 :30 and 7 :45 p. m. and the interview leading to his 
confession began at 8 :11 p. m. Defendant did not receive 
medical attention or have an opportunity to rest or wash him-
self. He was given only one cup of water before his confession 
was complete. During the interview he was so confused that 
he showed complete temporal disor-ientation. Defendant testi-
fied that he was fatigued, numb, confused and in increasing 
pain during the entire interview. He testified that he could 
51 C.2d-10 
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recall many of the 'Wore 
reeonled. He te:.;tified ll and 
his Jlal'HltS from fnr!llf•r ai j One or the 
offieers reminded him thaL he to " De-
fendant testified that the interview: ''I \Vould have 
with in the world let alonr. I would 
have said 'Yes' to in the world if had let me 
down and let me rest.'' 
'l'he only evidenec offered to contradid a condusion ol' coer-
cion was the of Officer who stated that 
defendant was not dazed when rescued and that confession 
vvas free and ''as far as he could observe.'' In view 
of Officer Peterson's observations of defendant's 
his knowledge of Harry Pettit's gesi nres toward 
defendant brandishing a deadly weapon, and defendant's 
visible injuries such a statement is not 
[1] The usc of confessions in a crimiual ob-
tained by force, promise of or reward consti-
tutes a denial of due process of Jaw both under the federal 
and state Constitutions requiring a reycrsal of the emwiction 
although other evidenee may be eom;i,tent with (Brown 
v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 28i:l-286 S.Ct. LJGJ, 80 LEd. 
G82] ; Ashcraft v. 322 U.S. 143 S.Ct. 921, 88 
hE d. 1192] ; JJialinski v. N cw York, 324 U.S. 401 jG5 S.Ct. 
781, 89 L.Ed. 1029]; People v. 103 Cal. 387, 394 [% 
P. 863]; see People v. 27 Cn1.2d 7 [161 P.2d 
934] .) "Usc of involuntary verbal tonfessions in State crim-
inal trials is eonstitnlionally obnoxious 11ot because of 
their nnrcliability. They are inadmis;,ible uwler the Due 
Process Clause even though statemenls em1tained in them may 
be independently established as true. Coer,•ed cou fessions 
offend the commuuity's sense of fair and 
Nothing would be more calculated io dis(~redit law and thereby 
to brutalize the temper of a '' · Y. 
342 U.S. 165, 173-174 [72 S.Ct. 205, D6 hEd. 1 2,) A.L.R.2d 
1396].) 
[2] As a reviewing court it is our duty to 
uncontradicted fads to determine 
trial court's conclusion of voluntar-iness was found. 
(Brown v. supra, 297 U.S. at 287; Chambers v. 
Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 228-229 S.Ct. 472, 84 L.Ed. 716] ; 
Liscnba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 237-238 [ 62 S.Ct. 280, 
86 LEd. 166] ; v. supra, 322 U.S. at 147-
148; Malinski v. New York, supra, 324l:'.S. at 404; Stroble v. 
PEOPLE v. BERVE 
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190 [72 S.Ct. 599, 96 L.Ed. 872] ; 
356 U.S. 3GO [78 S.Ct. 847, 
24 Cal.2d 609 [150 P.2d 
[6 P.2d 313].) 
that the 
eon fession was 
intimidation 
22 Cal.2d 787, 804 [141 P.2d 
supra, 24 Cnl.2cl at 608.) 
"nwutnl frC'edom" in eon fcssing 
supra, 322 U.S. at 1 or whethrr the 
eonfession \YilS the of free ehoiee (Payne v. Slate 
supm, 78 S.Ct. at 830). "The sliuhtest pressure, 
inducement to or threat if eon-
fesslon is wi1 
the eonfes'Oion. '' 
153 Cal. at :W4.) 
cocreive eondi: 
time i he (·OJ>fession 
452, 4;'Ji) i V. 
Cas. 1912B 1193]; 
[6] Exmuiuing the 
that the prosceui iou 
to re(ruire the exclusion of 
added; People v. supm, 
'l'he prmwn1iion must show that sueh 
no longer prevailcJ at the 
v. ,Johnson, 41 Cal. 
, 159 Cal. G, 14-15 [112 P. 720, Ann. 
suz1ra, 2:1 Cal.2d at 609.) 
lllll'ontradil·tcd eYidence Vie conelude 
failed to show that the obYions coer-
ciye tiremnstanccs to defendant',; eonfcssion had ceased 
to exist in the min(1 of the (1efcnclant at the time he uttered 
his COlllCSI>ion. 
Then) is HO threats of his torturers that he 
would he killea if he did not eon.fc,;s and that his parents 
\\:ould be harmed if aided him ~were obliterated before 
his confcs;sion. Fear of his own life and those of his parents, 
the cffPe1s of hi:' torture and his 
eoufuserl menial 
eon fes·-;ion, H hn'; 
of one's mo~lwr is 
hovered over the accused during this 
h('l<1 that the tlweat of mere arrest 
i o ! ai H t a (~onfession extracted 
on <·on,;liiniional Y. Jfcllus, 134 
v. Shelton, 
[7] Where there 
CaLApp. 21(), 22:3-226 l'.2(t 237]; see 
151 , 588 [:311 P.2c1 .) 
pf mob Yiolz•nee a confession 
id ou due proeess grounds. (Cham-
CS. at 240; v. 8tate of 
. ) T n the absenc:c of a show-
co:'n:wn no inf!ncnced de-
a c:onfessiou two after giYiug of induc:cments 
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and assurances that a ''clear case'' existed against accused is 
invalid. (People v. Johnson, supra, 41 Cal. at 455.) A con-
fession made to two sheriffs one day after a beating by other 
persons was struck down in Brown v. JJJississippi, S1tpra, 297 
U.S. 278. In the light of the above cases, it must be held that 
the continuing threat of death to himself and harm to his 
parents infected defendant's confession. 
[8] The actual physical and psychological effects of the 
beating the defendant absorbed were painfully fresh when 
he confessed. The police made no effort to assuage his physical 
suffering by giving him medical attention, opportunity to rest, 
or even sufficient water to drink or to wash himself. Although 
there was no threat of further violence by the police, this 
element was provided by the clear threats of his kidnapers. 
Torture destroys not only physically but psychologically. Ele-
ments of despair, fatigue, craving for companionship, identify-
ing one's interrogator as a friend and source of aid, and 
suggestions of guilt were all present in a crude, haphazard 
form in this case. 'rhey are the prime elements in the more 
devious and elaborate systems of menticide employed to obtain 
confession in totalitarian states. (See Sen. Rep. No. 2832, 
84th Cong., 2d Scss., ''Communist Interrogation, Indoctrina-
tion and Exploitation of American Military and Civilian Pris-
oners," esp. p. 3 ct seq. on the "Hussian Sy;;tem. ") Defend-
ant's physical and mental exhaustion ·were coordinate factors 
in invalidating the confessions in Lcyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 
[74 S.Ct. 716, 98 L.Ed. 948]. To say defcndant'f> confession 
was freely and voluntarily given is to say that none of these 
clements extended from his physical ordeal to his police inter-
rogation. It seems doubtful that the defendant would have 
readily confessed if he had been arrested before he had been 
mistreated by Pettit and his associates. 
[9] Testimony of defendant at the trial in which he as-
serted his relief at being rescued by police officers from the 
vengeful relatives of Mrs. Pettit is not susceptible to the infer-
ence that the subsequent confession was voluntary. The pre-
eise purpose in threatening the defendant was to force a 
confession. 'rhe two-hour inquisition was to instill in defend-
ant such a fear for his own safety and that of his parent;; that 
he >Yonld confes;.; to proper authorities although removed from 
immediate danger. Tlm:::, merely liberating the defendant 
eould not wipe out the threat::: of violence ringing in his cars 
if he did not confess. 'l'he price exacted for freedom from 
future reprisals was a confession. Momentary police sanctuary 
Dec, PEOPLE BERVE 293 
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eould not still defrndant's terror unless by 
promises of effective police protedion. Only thrn can there 
be grounds for assuming that Hw dd'('ndant has freedom of 
choice. 
[10] No valid grounds for distinction are to be found in 
the fact that the coercion iu this case was iuflicted by eivilians, 
and not the police. Decisions holding that confessions are 
inadmissible because thry were rendered under eonditions of 
threatened mob violence civilians against an accused dearly 
imply such conelusion. (Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 [ 43 
S.Ct. 265, 67 L.Ed. 543}; Wkite v. State, 129 Miss. 182 [91 
So. 903, 24 A.L.R. 699] ; Tmrnp Y. State, 104 Neb. 222 [176 
N.\V. 543] ; see eases collected 24 A.L.R. 706.) 'rhe prohibition 
which bars the use of involuntary confessions is 11ot only de-
signed as a regulation of the conduct of police offieers, but 
also to insure that an aecused 's right to a fair trial is pro-
tected. (Roehin v. California, supra, 342 U.S. at 173-174.) 
[11] The absence of volition eond0mns an enforced confes-
sion. Due process requires that it be given voluntarily and 
without promise of immunity or reward. On the record before 
us the confession here must be excluded. 
All the purported appeals from nonappealable orders listed 
in the notice of appeal are dismissed. The judgment is re-
versed. 
Gibson, C. J., 'rraynor, J., and Schauer, J., coneurred. 
McCOMB, J.-I dissent. In my opinion, a review of the 
entire record, including the testimouy of Deputy Sheriff Peter-
son, corroborated by the statements of the defendant himself, 
shows that the evidenee -vvas sufficient to j nstify the court 
in finding, as it did, that the confession of defendant was free 
and voluntary. There can be no question of defendant's guilt. 
I would affirm the judgment. 
Shenk, J., and Spence, J., eoncurred. 
Hespondent 's petition for a rehearing wa~; denied Dec-ember 
30, 1958. Shenk, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J., were of 
the opinion that the petition should be granted. 
